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Between two fires
These two groups of critics level 
charges at Al-Huda and Hashmi that 
seem to be mirror opposites of each 
other. The ulama find her lacking in 
qualifications that would equip her to 
interpret core religious texts and re-
ject her innovative pedagogical style 
on the basis of its rupture with tradi-
tional modes of learning. They are also 
horrified by the elevation of women 
to visible public roles as teachers and 
preachers of Islam. By casting doubts on the education Hashmi herself 
has received in the West, they go so far as to portray her as an agent 
of vested interests rooted in a western secular liberal ideology and her 
movement as a conspiracy to distort Islam so as to lure true believers 
away from religion. In their evaluation of the group’s practices, views 
and aims, the traditionalist ulama find it to be too modern. 
On the other hand, the second group of critics claims that Al-Hu-
da’s “brand of Islam is as retrogressive as the mullahs, but because 
she [i.e. Hashmi] is educated, speaks out against the religious right 
and is a woman, other women find her teachings more acceptable 
and legitimate.”1 In the English-language media and in conversations 
amongst the Pakistani intelligentsia, the movement is regularly de-
scribed using epithets like “reactionary,” “dogmatic,” “fundamentalist,” 
“conservative,” “anti-feminist,” and lambasted for being out of tune 
with the needs of contemporary women. In other words, they find 
it to be not modern enough. They have their own version of a con-
spiracy theory to explain Al-Huda’s rise, claiming that Hashmi “epito-
mizes hard-core, doctrinaire orthodoxy – a worldview which appears 
to be gaining strength as a result of ambitious funding from certain 
quasi-governmental organizations in Saudi Arabia and Yemen.”2 
These contradictory evaluations of Al-Huda by different groups of out-
siders speak of a more general ambivalence about how the group ought 
to be categorized. The familiar dichotomies between the traditional vs. 
the modern, conservative vs. progressive, and above all between fun-
damentalist/ religious vs. secular/liberal are unsettled when applied to 
this particular women’s movement. This confusion is visible in such re-
ports: “Now at social gatherings, women wearing the hijab are increas-
ingly seen alongside those in sleeveless dresses. With religion the new 
’in’ thing, it is questionable who is now the modern woman.”3 
Religious expertise and contested credentials
The ulama in Pakistan have been vociferous in their attacks on Farhat 
Hashmi and her credentials, as well as on the credibility of the entire 
enterprise she has launched. They argue that she has not been through 
the eight-year course of education that a religious scholar traditionally 
has to go through in South Asian Islam. Further, her higher education 
credentials are of doubtful merit in the eyes of the ulama for having 
been acquired in a western university under the supervision of non-
Muslims who themselves are not qualified for Quranic interpretation. 
For the ulama, she clearly does not have the authority or capability to 
interpret and comment on the canonical religious texts of Islam. Her 
students, having received one or two years of Islamic education at Al-
Huda, are not seen as being equipped to teach the Quran either. 
Many ulama from prominent Islamic schools in Pakistan have issued 
fatwas (formal opinions) on the work being carried out at Al-Huda, in 
Al-huda & its Critics
Religious Education
for Pakistani Women
f A i Z A  m u S h t A q The Al-Huda International Institute of 
Islamic Education for Women started as 
a small religious academy for women 
in Islamabad in 1994. Since then it has 
mushroomed into a well-organized 
movement with branches in large and 
small cities all across Pakistan, and 
now abroad as well. Dr. Farhat Hashmi, 
its founder and leader, has become a 
household name through her lecture 
tours, radio show, books, and cassettes. 
The primary activity Al-Huda offers is 
education in religious subjects that is intended to supplement rather 
than replace secular academic credentials, and by now thousands of 
Pakistani women have passed through these training courses. Hashmi 
herself is not a traditionally trained scholar but has a Ph.D. in Islamic 
Studies from Glasgow University.
The women of Al-Huda belong to the urban educated classes in Pa-
kistan and span all age ranges. Many graduates from the school go on 
to serve as teachers and organizers of new branches, as well as con-
ducting informal gatherings at private residences where women can 
be present in large numbers. The opportunities for congregation and 
leadership roles that are provided to women are new for many, as is the 
chance to study the Quran collectively and not just alone at home. Ear-
lier initiatives at offering religious instruction for Pakistani women have 
either tended to remain informal and localized, or have been subsidi-
ary units of larger male-run madrasas catering mostly to lower socio-
economic classes. Al-Huda’s education is distinctive in this context as it 
gives women the tools to approach, understand, and actively engage 
with the religious texts and also puts this learning at the service of a 
broader moral vision of character training and social reform. 
This education takes the form of rigorous one-and-a-half year diplo-
ma courses, less intensive certificate courses, programmes for children 
and for teenagers, short courses during summer, and in the special 
months of the Islamic calendar. All of them share a basic format and 
teaching philosophy. The main emphasis is on study of the Quran in 
three ways: a) Arabic recitation and listening; b) literal, word for word 
translation to memorize the basic vocabulary; and c) in-depth con-
textual explanation of each verse that also relates it to contemporary, 
practical concerns. Different courses include a mix of other subjects 
that supplement this core of Quranic study.
Hashmi’s followers explain her appeal by referring to her prowess as 
a teacher, her ability to communicate fluently in English, Urdu, and Ara-
bic, her logical building of arguments where she identifies the source of 
each opinion rather than invoking blind trust, and her devotion to her 
work. However she has attracted much criticism and controversy that 
has snowballed alongside her fame and the increasing visibility of her 
followers. Her critics come in various stripes but can be grouped into two 
categories. One is centred around the male scholars of Islam, or ulama, 
who have traditionally been the interpreters of religion and who perceive 
Hashmi and her brand of religious education as posing an alternative 
power structure and a challenge to their own authority. The other is a 
looser grouping of men and women who identify themselves as belong-
ing to the secular, liberal, educated segments of Pakistani society which 
include feminist and human rights activists, professionals, and members 
of the intelligentsia, who see the increasing presence of religion in public 
life as a threat to their progressive worldview and lifestyles.  
Organizations & Activism
In the past decade Pakistan has witnessed the 
emergence of Al-Huda, an institute offering 
religious education to women. Its popularity 
is greeted with hostile scepticism by many in 
Pakistan. Male religious scholars, feminists, and 
the mainstream media are amongst those who 
disagree with the practices of these women 
and their vision of moral reform. The author 
argues that by introducing women in new roles 
Al-Huda disrupts traditional structures for 
transmitting religious learning.
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obligations and restrictive practices for women, leaving some scope 
for flexibility and contextual understanding, but does not offer a thor-
oughgoing critique of existing gender relations or contentious Quranic 
verses in her lectures. She does, however, keep repeating a passion-
ate call for women to gain a well-rounded education, while many of 
her students and alumni pursue educational and professional careers. 
Al-Huda participants do not necessarily see themselves as making a 
choice between their spiritual and moral awakening, on the one hand, 
and their participation in the public sphere, on the other. Hashmi her-
self says: “Although I believe that the woman is in charge of the do-
mestic arena, I don’t think it should limit you as a productive member 
of society … For example, every human being has the responsibility 
to educate themselves and others … We don’t have time to spend in 
trivial pastimes.”8
Hashmi occasionally refers to herself as an “Islamic feminist,” and both 
terms in the label are contested by outsiders. Al-Huda is positioned to 
offer an alternative to the two extremes that flourished during the re-
gime of General Zia-ul-Haq in the 1980’s – the state-sanctioned, male-
dominated, and orthodox version of Islam and the stridently secular 
feminism of its opponents in the women’s movement – while selec-
tively utilizing elements of both. Hashmi and her followers emerged 
against the backdrop of improved access to higher education, mobility, 
and employment for urban women, and the absence of opportunities 
for women in mainstream Islamic institutions in Pakistan. The activism 
of Al-Huda participants is driven by moral concerns, and their enter-
prise of Islamic education reflexively links the goals of personal and so-
cial transformation. The most significant impact 
of the movement, however, might lie in its disrup-
tion of traditional structures and authorities for 
transmitting religious learning, by the introduc-
tion of women in these new roles.
response to questions and concerns raised by members of 
the public. In rejecting Hashmi’s authority they explicitly in-
voke the weight of their own qualifications and the historical 
evolution of their own role as guardians of the sacred knowl-
edge. Moreover, they see themselves as being comparable to 
specialists in other fields such as lawyers and doctors. They 
claim her approach assumes that the text of the Quran can 
be understood and interpreted only through translation, as 
if there is a direct correspondence of meaning to words, and 
dismisses the technicalities involved in Islamic law and the-
ology, and ignores the depth of issues and the evolution of 
scholarly opinions, debates, and consensus. By chucking out 
1400 years of intellectual history, she wants to turn religion 
into a matter of convenience and expediency. On the other 
hand, her lay critics argue that Hashmi’s “interpretation is 
dogmatic, fails to recognize the essential flexibility of Islam 
and that she is engaged more in developing a cult than en-
couraging a true understanding of religion.”4
Most of those who have been involved with the group grew 
up having read the Quran and being exposed to the basic 
teachings of Islam, and few of them doubt the religiosity of 
their mothers and grandmothers. Yet all agree that they have 
been introduced to something new through Al-Huda classes, 
i.e. a better, more powerful way of understanding the Quran. Instead 
of rote memorization, they learn to appreciate the Arabic language of 
the text, the significance of each verse and its relation to history and 
context, and what relevant personal meaning to extract from it. Simi-
larly, in her own statements, all Hashmi takes credit for is unlocking the 
power of the text for her students. She emphasizes the need to make 
the Quran approachable and relevant to all lives, and not let it remain 
only the subject of specialized discourses. The difference between her 
approach and that of the ulama is noted by enthusiastic participants: “I 
always wanted to study Islam in greater depth but balked when hearing 
the mullahs talk of heaven and hell and the purdah (veil)… It [Al-Huda’s] 
is a very practical, very precise version of Islam.”5 
Class and gender concerns
One of the most frequent criticisms of Al-Huda is that it targets 
women from the well-to-do urban upper and middle classes, and con-
sequently the newfound religiosity of these women can be suspected 
and brushed aside as a short-lived fad. One of the ulama scornfully 
points out that “they book expensive halls in the hotels and clubs of the 
big cities, where fashionable women congregate in the name of attend-
ing a dars-e-Quran.”6 Media reports are full of comments like: “These 
women spend hours at these religious sermons and could well spend 
that time doing some positive social work” … “It is also a cleansing 
issue. Many amongst our elite are corrupt to the bone. So the women 
of these houses now want to cleanse themselves.”7 This assumption 
blinds the critics to the full array of activities and membership that in 
fact characterize the group and limits the scope of public attention to 
their most visible, high-profile converts and events. Wealthy elites con-
tinue to be important in the organization’s expansion but a lot of the 
growth has come from middle-class urban neighbourhoods, and regu-
lar courses attract a diverse composition of enrolled students.
The ulama in Pakistan disagree especially strongly with Hashmi’s in-
terpretation of Islamic custom which states that women are allowed 
to go and pray at a mosque rather than in the privacy of their homes, 
and condemn her for not displaying appropriate modesty herself by 
appearing on the media and travelling internationally. On the other 
hand, the feminist and secular-liberal critics are disturbed by her and 
her followers’ conservatism, especially their practice of veiling them-
selves, and of not questioning unequal gender roles within the fam-
ily and community. They decry the conservative interpretations of the 
Quran and the unquestioning acceptance of the group leader’s views 
that these classes offer, as well as the confinement of these women to 
their roles as compliant housewives. 
Activism
Al-Huda’s innovations as a religious movement lie more in its or-
ganizational practices and teaching methods than in its interpretive 
strategies, and much of Hashmi’s intellectual output is based on con-
ventional sources and reformist critiques of Islam. She challenges the 
more orthodox teachings of male Pakistani scholars on issues like ritual 
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